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MOTIVATION AND PERSON: THE ETHICAL LIFE 
AS A STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS  
Nicola Zippel 
Abstract: Starting from the separation between rational and irra- 
tional motivation, Husserl elaborates a formal ethics which justifies 
the universal validity of its principles on the logical feature of pro- 
position. On the other hand, since the irrationality of motivation 
represents the associative stream of consciousness constituting the 
passive background of rational life of subject, the formal aspect of 
Husserlian ethics seems to be well rooted in the materiality and con-
creteness of existence. For this reason, it becomes hard to maintain  
the separation between the two kinds of motivation, and it is neces- 
sary to study in depth their intentional connection. 
1. Rational and Irrational Motivation 
In the Chapter VI of the Introduction to Ethics of 1920s, after criti- 
cally dealing with the hedonist reading of the moral, Husserl inter- 
rupts the historical confrontation with the previous theories to intro- 
duce the basic theme of motivation using an authentically phenome- 
nological description. 
Such a description begins referring to the sensualistic and natu- 
ralistic psychology mentioned and criticised in the prior chapters, in 
order to stress its inborn limits that blinds it “to the peculiar sense 
which the question concerning the reason has and can only have, the 
question concerning the origin of spiritual matter of fact”1. The 
                                                     
1 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924, Hua XXXVII, 
Hrsg. von H. Peucker, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, p. 104.  
Eros 
198 
reference to the sphere of the “reason” and of the “origin” not only 
points to the direction an ethical investigation must follow, but also 
gives a first, implicit connotation of the ethics itself. A little bit further 
ahead in the text Husserl indeed explains that “the peculiar essence 
of the entire spiritual sphere refers to the essence of the subjects of the 
whole spirituality as subjects of intentional lived experiences; these subjects 
are Egos, are personal subjects.”2. To question the reason and the 
origin involves then paying attention to the intentional subjectivity as 
person, since the “whole” spiritual essence shows itself only in the 
personal shape of consciousness; hence, the analysis of such an 
essence can allow the complete elaboration of a philosophical ethics3.  
To reach the origin of the spiritual life, namely the realm of 
motivation, means finding a very complex structure which is divided 
according to the basic difference between “rational” and “irrational” 
motivation. To the latter corresponds the territory of the “passive or 
affective, inferior” spirituality4. Here continuous sense-references 
take place generated within the stream of consciousness without a 
real control by the Ego; they occur through an unaware process of the 
spiritual life which is based on the association. Husserl gives the 
example of someone’s name that, once pronounced, reawakens the 
memory of a trip occurred in the past with him. But the currently 
present thought doesn’t concern the person or the trip; rather, it 
refers to the Engadin, namely the place visited with that person. 
Starting from this thought suddenly emerged to the current attention 
I go back over the elapsed stream of consciousness and finally find 
the associative link between the pronounced name, the trip to 
Engadin, and the current thought of Engadin. According to Husserl, 
this thought is the result of an irrational motivation, since though it is 
understandable as to its “reason”, it is not the effect of an aware 
theoretical course by the subject; the subject did not decide to think 
about Engadin, but rather it happened to her to think about it. 
On the contrary, if I state that Germany will rise again from the 
post-war depression thanks to the capacity of German people, this 
statement shows the traits of rational motivation; in the same way  
the answer to the question about the reason of our action or 
behaviour is rational if “one responds presenting the guide-goal”5. 
Husserl explains that in both cases the assertions are expressed by full 
                                                     
2 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 104.  
3 See Ullrich Melle, «Husserl’s personalist ethics», in Husserl Studies, no 1, 2007, pp. 1-15. 
4 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 107. 
5 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 107.  
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awareness and as such they are able to exhibit a rational ground: they 
can not only justify the origin of their emerging, which is also 
possible in the case of the thought addressed to the Engadin, but they 
also can appeal to the legitimacy of their content, and account for 
what they express. Despite being intentionally motivated (one can 
explain its emergence going back over the intentional-constitutive 
stream), the thought of Engadin is not rationally legitimated: it 
doesn’t account for reason. In this sense, it is out of an ethical 
explanation, and so it risks crossing the border of being under- 
standable. It is the case of the entrance in the consciousness’ life of an 
unexpected sensible datum, such as a sudden bang: “The bang 
produces itself and flows through the consciousness, but it has, in a 
strict sense, no «genesis». Nevertheless, if I recognize it as a signal 
announcing a counter-signal, then the entrance of the latter in the 
consciousness has its genesis”6. But also in this case the motivation is 
irrational, because it doesn’t need to justify the right to expect a 
counter-signal, although such an expectation is entirely understand- 
dable with regard to its intentional genesis.  
Husserl doesn’t further deal with such “inferior” level and des- 
cribes it as “that of pure passivity which denotes the trait of the 
psychic, of what is ego-less (ichlos), namely of the substrate flowing 
without an active participation by the Ego […]. In the lower sphere of 
consciousness, in the sub-egological one (unter-ichlich), geneses flow, 
motivational binds interweave, but in a entirely passive way; here the 
Ego doesn’t act, doesn’t unify anything; here everything occurs by 
itself”7. And yet one has to add: everything occurring in that sphere 
constitutes the passive root of the active life and as such it has 
repercussions on the aware surface belonging to the properly sub- 
jective dimension, like in the example of the Engadin. To what extent 
do such repercussions intervene in the field of the ethical decisions? 
To what extent the “superior” level of the motivational rationality is 
conditioned by the “inferior” level, the one of the associative 
irrationality? On the basis of Husserl’s statements there seems to be 
no determining interaction between the two levels, considering that 
to the irrational motivations as such “one can’t clearly put any 
question of reason”8; and, on the other hand, the motivations emerging 
within the sphere of egological act “are motivations of reason, which 
                                                     
6 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 109, emphasis mine.  
7 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 110.  
8 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 111. 
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means that these motivations submit to the questions regarding the 
rationality and the irrationality, the legitimacy and the illegitimacy”9. 
From this point on Husserl leaves the correlation between passive 
and active motivation and focuses only on the latter, which repre- 
sents the original source of a possible ethical life. This ethical sphere 
is described through a continuous parallelism with the logical sphere. 
Such a parallelism (that Husserl had already presented in Chapter I 
of the book) is based on the consideration that the logic sets out its 
truths apart from the relation with the unaware, irrational, passive 
dimension of consciousness’ life. Nevertheless, if this is valid for the 
logic, is it equally valid for the ethics which is so structurally tied to 
the living dimension of subject as person that it is very hard to 
separate rationality and irrationality?  
For now we follow the course of argument by Husserl, who 
describes in detail the rational motivation and its multiple sense-
connections directly or indirectly referring to the centrality of the ego- 
logical, subjective decision. Also in the case of a sort of “mechanic- 
czation” of the ethical choices, i.e. when the moral virtues are applied 
according to an apparently independent habit, this mechanization 
“has to be preceded by an active ethical decision. A habitual spur to 
do the “good” to others that doesn’t stem from the application of 
authentic acts of love for the neighbour is a blind, irrational ins- 
tinct”10. In this way, Husserl refutes the claim of sensualist psycho- 
logy to ground the altruism on an originary egoism which becomes a 
virtue thanks to a habitual mechanism lacking an aware choice by the 
Ego. Husserl affirms that if the choice fails, the responsibility fails too, 
and so the worth of the choice fails. If we do the good on the basis of 
a mechanic habit, our action is not suitable to be judged right or 
wrong, since it follows an inner necessity that as such can’t be other- 
wise. But it is precisely this “to can be otherwise” that characterizes 
every ethical decision of the subject which in turn can be valuated as 
to its legitimacy or illegitimacy. On the contrary, if the ethical life is 
reduced to the pure natural sphere of the mechanic though motivated 
association, this life lacks “of the inner sense and of the corres- 
ponding inner rational valorisation which must be the motivational 
base of the tending to do something”11. A phenomenological analysis 
of the ethical behaviour can reveal this rational, aware root of moti- 
vation; since such analysis only is able to distinguish the two levels of 
                                                     
9 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 112.  
10 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 116.  
11 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 116.  
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motivation and to understand that every modification in the sub- 
jective attitude even though it occurs on a passive background, it is 
not reducible to this passivity, but it shapes a lucid and carefully 
considered life which became emancipated from the mere associative 
connection. This is a life able as such to justify itself and to which one 
can ask for justification.  
2. Rationality and Subjectivity  
The egological, subjective trait is crucial to understand the ratio- 
nality connoting the life as an ethical one. Every Ego-act bestows 
sense to the means and the aims that are adopted by the ethical 
behaviour, which makes the rational motivation a privileged form of 
active intentionality; because it ignored the intentional mark of sub- 
jective life, the complex, yet comprehensible play of sense-references 
of this life, the sensualist psychology wasn’t able to elaborate a 
genuine, authentic ethics, which develops through acts undergoing 
valuation and judgment. Paradoxically, the mechanization of ethical 
life thought by the sensualist psychology exempts this ethics from 
critiques, since one can’t be considered responsible for actions that 
he/she doesn’t master. Just like there is neither worth nor blame if one 
thinks of the Engadin. Nevertheless, such an exemption from the 
valuation is based not on an ethical perfection, rather on the absence of 
a real ethical connotation. Without praise or blame, the Ego of the 
sensualist psychology doesn’t deal with ethics, and her judgements 
don’t concern the logical dimension. On the contrary, the Ego of 
phenomenological ethics is continuously submitted to the valuation 
of her acts, and her logical judgments are always considered right or 
wrong; her ethical choices as well as her logical statements take place 
within the sphere of full rational awareness. Husserl explains that in 
this sphere it is possible to accomplish an original “appropriation”, a 
solid “having” of a choice or of a judgment, and in this way one 
becomes responsible of her own actions and sentences.  
Parallelism with the logic helps Husserl to refute as a whole the 
naturalist psychology that fails “in all of the problems of reason”12 
logical as well as ethical, because in both the same subjective feature is 
involved, which is precisely the one misunderstood by psychology. 
Furthermore, this parallelism reinforces the conceptual capacity of 
phenomenological ethics, since the sense-bestowments determining 
                                                     
12 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 116.  
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the essence of judging and the comprehension of the logic act in 
parallel in the development of the ethics of the subject’s life. Therefore 
Husserl points out that “one has investigated so in depth the sphere 
of judgment and the specific of judging reason in the ambit of judge-
motivations, that one can expect to find in the other act-spheres and 
their peculiar act-motivations parallel eidetic situations”13. The constant 
reference to the logic means the criterion to confer to the ethical acts 
an analogous rationality in order to give the motivation a scientific 
mark as expression of ethical laws. Only if the ethical sentences 
possess an intrinsic legality they can demand to be valid for all in the 
same way of a logical principle. According to a phenomenological 
perspective, the eidetic character makes the law an all-encompassing, 
universal rule provided with that invariability which is valid each 
time and in each space. Such validity is a form of rationality and so it 
plays a basic role in the concreteness of subjectivity, which is deter- 
mined by the motivation and constitutes the natural place for wor- 
king out and respecting the ethical norms. 
Precisely such constitutive passage through the egological features 
warrants the concrete, empirical effect of ideal validity on the daily, 
worldly existence; the proposition (Satz) as the elementary Ego’s act 
expresses, grounds, and communicates a normative eidos: “as far as, 
idealiter, arrives in general the possibility that a proposition the Ego 
puts can be put by everyone, and through an ideally possible 
empathy it can be recognized as the same by everyone […] then every 
foundation or removal of fundament is a priori a common good”14. 
The public, social level of subjective life allows to enlarge over the 
personal horizon an ethical conviction, since the approval by others is 
not only a confirmation of his/her own opinions, but it represents also 
an acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the expressed ideas15. In the 
case such opinions utter a rational motivation they have an eidetic 
legality as sense-correlate. Husserl states that the asserted proposition 
becomes a “common good” (Gemeingut), because it does not gain its 
argumentative power from the public agreement, but rather it is 
publicly agreed as expression of an eidos. It is “unthinkable” (i.e. 
                                                     
13 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 116. 
14 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 121.  
15 The social dimension of Husserlian ethics has been recently put in evidence through a 
comparison of Husserl’s thought with Rawls’ political philosophy. See Margaret Steele, 
«Husserl and Rawls: Two Attempts to Free Moral Imperatives from Their Empirical Origin», in 
Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics. Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus, Vandevelde, P., Luft, 
S. (Eds.), London & New York, Continuum, p. 222.  
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theoretically, logically inacceptable) that where a right appears, who 
recognizes it could deny its validity16. 
As structures of a consciousness’ subject who draws directly from 
the eidetic nucleus of a truth, logic and ethics are parallel forms 
expressing one and the same scientific rigorous source, to which 
modern philosophy could not aspire, because of its naturalistic 
tendency depending on the example of positive sciences. The theo- 
retical trait of reason, along with its valuing activity by proposition, 
seems to throw off balance the parallelism towards a logical 
foundation of ethics, namely towards a building of a logical ethics. 
Only by this it is possible to oppose with efficacy the ethics to the 
sceptical objections that pick on the reason on the whole with regard 
both to the judgement and to the valuation. As it is a form of 
knowledge and grounds itself on the validity of principles first 
thought and subsequently applied, ethics bases its practical capacity 
on the conceptual solidness of its statements, which in turn must 
have a theoretical, logical strictness guaranteeing their right to be 
valid in a universal way. Such strictness is due to the eidetic, i.e. the 
legal hallmark that ethics not only shares but also derives from logic, 
of which it uses the propositional form. From the beginning of the 
lectures Husserl explicitly states that ethics “has the advantage of 
having the pattern of logic, and it is very relevant considering the 
inmost affinity that essentially exists between the ethical problematic 
and the logical one”17. Such affinity is already noticeable with regard 
to the common struggle against the naturalistic philosophy both as 
logical scepticism (psychologismus) and as ethical scepticism (hedo- 
nism, utilitarianism, aestheticism). When he recalls the medieval 
doctrines on the supra-empirical validity of ethical truths as regards 
the relation between God and such truths, Husserl evokes not by 
accident examples made in the Prolegomena to the Logical Investiga- 
tions18, and clearly confirms the parallelism with the logic: “what is 
ethically good (like what is logically true) is good (or true) not 
because God requests it and arbitrarily has in this way established, 
rather God requests it, because it is good in itself, it is true in itself”19. 
                                                     
16 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, pp. 121-122. 
17 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 30.  
18 See Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. II Band. Erster Teil, Hua XIX/1, Hrsg. von U. 
Panzer, The Hague, M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, § 36. Work that he plainly reminds in the § 3 of 
the Introduction to the Ethics.  
19 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 130. In his previous lectures on ethics in Gottingen, 
Husserl elaborated in depth such correlation with the logic. See Edmund Husserl, Vorlesungen 
über Ethik und Wertlehre (1908-1914), Hua XXVII, Hrsg. von U. Melle, Dordrecht, Kluwer Acade- 
mic Publishers, 1988. Henning Peucker observes that this reference to the logical dimension also 
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Nevertheless, in the following pages Husserl himself warns about 
the risk inherent in this parallelism, if it assumes the shape instituted 
by Ralph Cudworth20 and Samuel Clarke21 between mathematical 
laws and ethical laws. The mathematical law possessing an intrinsic 
incontrovertibility is made by Cudworth and Clarke a synonymous 
of natural law that is impossible to violate; the ethical law provi- 
ded with the “material” (sachlich) characters of the mathematical law 
could in turn not be violated, and that implies a de-responsibility of 
the Ego who remains the real subject in all of the senses of Husserlian 
ethics22. Hence, the parallelism with the logic must not assume the 
form of an ethical rationalism, which makes the practical legalities 
other expressions of the physical nature that is on principle “extra-
normative and extra-valuative (außer-wertlich)”23.  
The motivation phenomenologically considered as basic property 
of subjective life allows not reducing the ethics to a system of objec- 
tive life without a reference to the intentional i.e. human dimension of 
existence24. This relation becomes visible if one shifts the attention 
from the eidetic sphere to the concrete praxis occurring in the spiri- 
tual life, “the life which is first of all infinitely rich and multiform, the 
life which one lives in first person, in which one is living and deve- 
lops”25. As a philosophy of lived experience, phenomenology is the 
method that permits to reveal the deeper structures of an ethics of 
person. As it shifts “the regard backwards on the Ego and on the 
egological activity itself”26, phenomenology is able to grasp the cons- 
titutive trait of self-determination, which puts the eidetic legality in the 
personal life of subject. By adapting Shaftesbury’s discourse on 
                                                                                                                            
in the reflections from 1920s testifies the persistence of a formal basis of phenomenological 
ethics. See Henning Peucker, «Einleitung des Herausgebers», in Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in 
die Ethik, p. XXIV. With regard to this parallelism logic/ethics as forms of reason see also Ullrich 
Melle, «Husserl’s personalist ethics», p. 8.   
20 Ralph Cudworth [1731], A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, New York, 
Garland, 1976. 
21 Clarke [1706], A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the 
Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann, 1964. 
22 In the first “Kaizo” article, Husserl talks about a centering Ego-pole, in which the conscious- 
ness’ acts stand in a connection of motivation. See Edmund Husserl Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-
1937), Hua XXVII, Hrsg. von T. Nenon und H.-R. Sepp, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publi- 
shers, 1989, p. 8.  
23 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 146.  
24 See Marcus Brainard, «“For a New World”: On the practical impulse of Husserlian theory», in 
Husserl Studies, no 1, 2007, pp. 17-31.  
25 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 124. 
26 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 123.  
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“reflection”27, Husserl makes the reflection an act requested by an 
Ego who is motivated “to want herself as Ego who-wants-the-
good”28. This is a motivation that moves the Ego not only to desire 
and to do the good, but also to verify that each of her actions 
corresponds to her purposes. Such a reflection doesn’t take place only 
a posteriori with the task to sanction the pretended legitimacy of the 
accomplished act, but it has, besides the evaluative function, also the 
constitutive function and contributes together with the motivation to 
the constant renewal of the personal-ethical Ego’s life29. Motivating 
herself to do the good, and contextually reflecting upon the validity 
and efficacy of her motivations, the Ego determines herself as a 
subject who consciously chooses the attitude to assume. The idea of us 
as moral persons involves recognizing both the continuity of the 
actions addressed to a goal and the personal responsibility for the cohe- 
rence of the praxis. The moral Ego knows herself “not only as the one 
who lives and tends in a specific way, but also as the one led and 
determined by herself, as the one wanted and gained on the basis of a 
reflective self-valuation. The moral Ego knows herself as causa sui of 
her own morality”30.  
3. Passivity and Rationality 
This self-control, once it is firmly acquired by the Ego, assumes the 
habitual shapes of morality that goes on daily in an “unreflective” 
manner, according to “a unitarily teleological regulation, whose form 
is co-instituted in advance, but whose material content is determined 
subsequently through the unforeseeable course of «experience», in 
which the moral will confer a form to this course”31. Although it 
                                                     
27 Shaftesbury, Anthony A. Cooper, Third Earl of [1711], Characteristics of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
28 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 162.  
29 As regards the topic of renewal, see Edmund Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge, p. 20 sqq. 
30 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 163. Tom Nenon plainly gets to the point of the 
connection between responsibility and evaluation in Husserlian ethics: “What makes us ethi- 
cally responsible is not that we normally do subject all of our actions to explicit or even implicit 
scrutiny through second-order mental acts but rather that we see ourselves as always in 
principle capable of doing so if we choose to reflect on them as our own and capable of evaluating 
them in terms of the general norms for practical rationality”, Tom Nenon, «Freedom, Respon- 
sibility, and Self-Awareness in Husserl», in Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philo- 
sophers, R. Bernet, D. Welton, G. Zavota (Eds.), London & New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 155.  
31 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 164. As John Drummond clearly explains: “Both 
the material and contextual dimensions of our evaluative judgements indicate that the absolute 
and universal character which belongs to the laws of formal axiology might not belong to the 
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unfolds by now in an unreflective manner, the moral life remains 
anyway guided by the reflection which originally determines its daily 
path and makes this life a “second nature”, in the sense that “the 
morality entirely belongs to the realm of spirituality and doesn’t 
belong at all (gar nicht) to the realm of sub-spiritual (unter-geistig) 
passivity of the psyche or to the realm of psycho-physical nature”32. 
One has to ask: can Husserl affirm with legitimacy that the 
morality doesn’t belong “at all” to the passive sphere, to the dimen- 
sion of pure egoless consciousness? The radical meaning of this 
assertion is not justified considering what Husserl himself said about 
motivation in the aforementioned pages. Although the separation 
between rational and irrational motivation is clearly put with regard 
to the lacking participation of the Ego to the reasonless, i.e. passive 
streaming of the pure consciousness’ motivations, Husserl adds that 
in this sphere “we have no Ego’s act, an act of truth-reckoning, of 
judging, of valuing, albeit such an act can refer to it [the stream] and 
albeit all of these acts can draw nourishment (Nahrung ziehen) from 
this consciousness’ background”33. This passage doesn’t allow to 
affirm the entire not-belonging of morality to the sub-spiritual, sub-
egological life of the psyche. The formation of the Ego reaches its full 
development as a rational and practical person in the ethical life 
consciously self-determined, responding to the motivations that 
move the subject to establish norms of behaviour provided with  
an eidetic and so universally binding content. Nevertheless, such 
personal development has an undeletable root precisely in that 
egoless, pre-reflective sphere which gives nourishment to the rational 
subject34. 
                                                                                                                            
concrete moral judgments we make. Those judgments have not only a formal dimension but a 
material one (both a priori and empirical), and the material dimension is relative to the context 
in which the concrete judgment is made”, Drummond «Moral Objectivity. Husserl’s Sentiments 
of the Understanding», in Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, R. Bernet, 
D. Welton, G. Zavota (Eds.), London & New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 84.  
32 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 165.  
33 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 111.  
34 In the same years of the Ethic’s Lectures, Husserl develops the centrality of motivation with 
regard to the inner life of subject and her relationship with the surrounding world. See Husserl 
1966. See also the following proper remarks by Anthony Steinbock: “Relations of motivation 
permeate all dimensions of intentional life: broadly speaking, with the active sphere in terms of 
egoic motivations of interest; within the passive sphere, e.g. in terms of fusion or connection of 
matters within a sense-field, or again, in terms of kinaesthetic motivations; and in the transition 
from the passive to the active sphere […].”, Anthony Steinbock «Translator’s Introduction», in 
Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001, XLVII.  
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The higher level of personality is the one in which an individual 
holds “the capacity to consciously let him/herself be guided in the self-
formation by the norms of ethical duty”35; in that case, the proposi- 
tional formulation of the principles of practical behaviour achieves the 
scientific strictness of logic, and therefore the “consciousness’ back- 
ground” doesn’t exert any determining influence. But in the daily, 
habitual course of moral life in which the logical form of principles 
meets the unforeseeableness of experience, what happens in the sphere 
of irrationality, while not determining for the evaluation of an ethical 
choice, structurally contributes as passive intentionality for the 
realization of the active performances of subject. Precisely as “second” 
nature of a “first” i.e. primordial, primal nature, the moral life with 
regard to its habitual route and in the unreflective constituting stratifications 
belongs to the inferior sphere of consciousness’ passivity36.  
Once the normative form, which each act of ethical life must 
undergo, is established, the feature of reflection is constantly conta- 
minated by the concrete contact with the experience, namely with the 
sensible elements of passive intentionality enabling such contact. The 
first element is precisely the irrational motivation as association.  
Thus the ethical life assumes in a phenomenological perspective 
the shapes of a subjective ethics, an ethics of a person who sets up 
fully consciously her own basic principles according to eidetic lega- 
lities as universally normative; but as the ethics of a person provided 
also with an inborn passive structure determining her development 
just as rational individual, it is an ethics not entirely under subjective 
control. This does not concern the self-evaluation, which is founded on 
the rational nature of the decisional top of ethical praxis i.e. the Ego37, 
but it exactly refers to that passive “background” that the Ego has to 
use as a sensible filter necessary to achieve an ethical, concrete expe- 
rience. It is precisely on the basis of this standpoint that Husserl 
criticizes the Kantian formalism blameworthy to be lacking the 
“consideration regarding the matter of will, the material contents 
                                                     
35 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 9. 
36 In the Appendix VI of his Ethics, Husserl talks again of the relationship between rational, 
active motivation and irrational, passive motivation, and defines the latter as the humus (Mutter- 
boden) of reason, which as such has the predisposition (Empfänglichkeit) to the authentically 
rational life of subject. What is produced in the active, aware reason it is already outlined (schon 
angelegt) on the field of passive motivation as “potential reason”. See Edmund Husserl, Einlei- 
tung in die Ethik, p. 332.  
37 In the third “Kaizo” article, Husserl affirms that the “personal self-consideration (inspectio 
sui)” belongs to the essential skills of man. See Husserl 1989, 23. It is about what Drummond 
properly calls “the moral urgency at the heart of Husserl’s philosophy: to decide for oneself”, 
Drummond, 2005, 96.  
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worth, so to speak, being desired, [consideration that] can show the 
way I must will in the concrete case; these material contents them- 
selves have to provide me the basis of will, the reasons of will, to 
provide me and equally to each rational being”38.  
Leaving out of consideration whether the critical remark moved 
by Husserl to Kant is legitimate or not39, it is worth stressing that such 
a remark needs to be properly maintained so that one doesn’t totally 
separate the morality from the sphere of passivity; the acknow- 
ledgment of the being rooted in the materiality, in the impersonal 
concreteness of consciousness, allows to develop a person’s ethics 
which doesn’t reduce itself to mere formal statements, but it is able to 
give a philosophical guide to the individual praxis already inserted in 
the everyday “unforeseeable” experience. Nevertheless, to admit the 
contamination of lucid and rational intentionality of the ethical Ego 
by the spontaneous and irrational intentionality of the stream of 
consciousness40 means that one has to consider to what extent the 
mixture of activity and passivity occurring in every concrete acts 
conditions, co-originates and even modifies the solidness of enun- 
ciation of ethical principles. If the irrationally motivated thought of 
Engadin has no influence on my moral behaviour, is it possible to 
affirm the same with regard to a potential thoughtless, unreflective 
reaction to an ethical norm? In that case one has a norm whose 
universal validity is known and theoretically established, and yet 
whose validity has been concretely violated. If the irrational moti- 
vation constitutes the nourishment of subjective praxis, and if this 
motivation as irrational is considered not-chargeable, does it mean a 
de-responsibility of personal action? This probing points to the classic 
question of free will of individual41. 
                                                     
38 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 235.  
39 Critical remarks about Husserl’s statements regarding Kant’s imperative have been recently 
expressed by Rinofner-Kreidl. See Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, «Husserl’s Categorical Imnperative and 
His Related Critique of Kant», in Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics. Current Investigations of Husserl’s 
Corpus, Vandevelde, P., Luft, S. (Eds.), London & New York, Continuum, 2010, pp. 188-210.   
40 In his latest reflections on time-consciousness, Husserl distinguishes between an inauthentic 
intentionality belonging to the egoless sphere of passivity, and the authentic intentionality of Ego’s 
active, aware performances. See Edmund Husserl, Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934). Die 
C-Manuskripte, Hrsg. von D. Lohmar, «Husserliana Materialen VIII», Dordrecht, Springer, 2006, 
Ms. C 6, pp. 112-113. Within the ambit of the inquiry on ethics, such distinctions can be expressed 
by the following terminology: “There is intentionality in the sense onf consciousness-of and there 
is intentionality in the sense of striving, tendency”, Ullrich Melle, «Husserl’s Phenomenology of 
Willing», in Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, R. Bernet, D. Welton, G. 
Zavota (Eds.), London & New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 75.  
41 Husserl was well aware of the difficult to clearly define the autonomous realm of will, as one 
can infer from this passage contained in a manuscript quoted by Melle: “the general 
investigation of the possible structures of willing is in need of the difficult investigations of the 
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On the other hand, if the sub-egological, pre-reflective sphere of 
life is involved in the moral behaviour, the discourse about moti- 
vation needs to be rethought starting not from the separation bet- 
ween irrational and rational motivation, i.e. between stream of 
consciousness and Ego, rather from a more careful consideration of 
their structural, congenital, and problematic interrelations42.     
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